S-a lansat IRANIUM on-line! Aveti la dispozitie O ZI


    Va semnalam intr-un Monitor realizarea unui documentar (IRANIUM) despre Iran, inarmarea nucleara si primejdia pe care o reprezinta Islamismul, in general.

    In data de 18 ianuarie era programata lansarea oficiala in Canada la National Archives Theatre din Ottawa. Vlad Tepes si Gates Of Vienna au scris despre scandalul care s-a iscat in seara mult asteptata. Pregatirile au purces pana cand a sosit o plangere de la Ambasada Iranului, prin care se cerea ca IRANIUM sa nu fie difuzat. Sensibilitatea musulmana punea din nou stapanire pe vajnicii mujahedini.

    Ministrul Patrimoniului James Moore a replicat destul de taios in apararea libertatii de exprimare in Canada.

    Claire Lopez (Center for Securty Policy) a fost intervievata de catre Vlad Tepes:

    Inchei prin a va reaminti celor care v-ati inregistrat prin email ca puteti viziona IRANIUM on-line gratuit pe tot parcursul zilei de 8 februarie


    Print Friendly, PDF & Email


    1. minutul 18:04“O femeie ce urmeaza sa fie executata va ajunge in Paradis, daca este virgina. Din acest motiv va fi violata inainte de executie. Astfel [calaii] se asigura ca nu va ajunge niciodata in Paradis.”

    2. Vlad P, din cite stiu, o femeie nu poate fi executata daca este necasatorita, nu din cauza virginitatii. Asta ar fi motivul pentru care erau violate inainte, probabil si luate de neveste, inainte de executie. Uite un exemplu:

      În Republica Islamică Iraniană, este ilegal să execuţi o femeie tînără, indiferent de crima de care se face vinovată, dacă aceasta este încă virgină. Un ofiţer al miliţiei paramilitare Basiji din Iran povesteşte cum în tinereţe, cînd acesta avea 18 ani, reuşind să se facă cunoscut şi agreat de superiorii lui, a fost privilegiat cu dreptul de a se putea căsători cu tinerele fete condamnate la moarte. Acestea nu puteau fi ucise virgine fiind, iar misiunea ofiţerului era de a se căsători cu ele, pentru a le putea deflora(legal) înainte de execuţie.
      “Regret ce am făcut, deşi căsătoriile erau legale”, a spus ofiţerul.
      De ce regrete, căsătoriile fiind “legale”?

    3. Costin,

      Soudabeh Ardavan: “Sexual torture is another tool to crush the prisoner. It is not something that just occurred. Looking at the actions of the Islamic Republic and the torturers during the 1980s, they always thought they could torture more, especially women, in this way. One of the most common finds is that female political prisoners, especially during the years when we were in prison, were mostly 17 or 18 years old—young and unmarried. [The torturers, guards, authorities] thought that girls must be raped before being executed so that they don’t go to paradise. This was systematic. They had religious justification behind [such belief].

      “We have examples. For example, the Tabriz prison, they would systematically rape the majority of girls but neither the social nor political circumstances were right for victims of these rapes to speak out. There was also no one from within the regime who would reveal. We have stories which are still behind the veil.

    4. Costin A.,

      La cei ce merg pe calea lui Allah totul se poate. Ce nu s-a putut ieri, se poate azi. Pana si Allah se razgandeste si practica abrogarea propriilor decizii.

      Ia uitati si fragmentul despre care spuneam. Scuzati calitatea

    5. E un film propagandistic care exprima un anumit punct de vedere. Abordarea nu e in nici un caz obiectiva sau echilibrata. E vorba de o dramatizare a unui punct de vedere preponderent in America, in special de factura republicana. In alta ordine de idei, filmul poate parea o instigare la razboi impotriva Iranului, ceea ce e in sine un act reprobabil. Se ofera si justificarea pentru doctrina autoapararii preemptive, folosita cel mai recent in Irak. De altfel, si la inceputul razboiului impotriva Irakului se gaseau americani care sa se jure cu mana pe inima ca Saddam Hussein are arme de distrugere in masa, care apoi nu s-au gasit. Insa aceasta banuiala a stat la baza atacarii Irakului …
      Sa fim seriosi …

    6. 😆 Ce ma distreaza astia cu “abordarea echilibrata”.

      Ce inseamna, doamna, “abordare echilibrata” in contextul republicii islamiste iraniene? Liderii iranieni urla “Moarte Americii” si “Moarte ISraelului” in fiecare zi si dvs. sustineti ca a fi preocupat de asemenea manifestari ale dementei islamiste este doar “un punct de vedere”? Daca eu as incepe sa scriu si sa urlu “MOARTE LUI CARMEN MADGEARU!”, facand tot ce imi sta in putere pentru a afla unde stati dvs. si membrii familiei din care faceti parte, ati mai fi atat de “echilibrata”, incat sa dormiti linistita la noapte?

    7. Carmen, sa fim seriosi, cum spui tu. Ai gasit ceva neadevarat in film? Filmul “exprima un anumit punct de vedere”. Bineinteles, se poate altfel? Dar te-ai intrebat daca acel “anumit punct de vedere” este real, sau esti sigura ca e doar o facatura “republicana”?

      Asta e important, nu ca nu iti place tie. Nu iti place, nu te uita, e problema ta, dar argumentele de tipul “un film propagandistic de factura republicana” nu spun nimic, iar orbul progresistului de care suferi nu te ajuta decit sa ignori lucrurile care nu iti convin, deci nu te privesc decit pe tine. Problema cu genul tau de abordare ramine aceeasi: realitatea nu se sinchiseste de parerea ta si de gusturile tale. Despre asta e vorba. Vizionare placuta!

    8. Madgearu.

      la inceputul razboiului impotriva Irakului se gaseau americani care sa se jure cu mana pe inima ca Saddam Hussein are arme de distrugere in masa, care apoi nu s-au gasit.

      Data viitoare cand va copleseste nevoia sa mestecati in public ciunga uzata cu “Saddam nu a avut arme de distrugere in masa” ar fi cazul sa va aduceti aminte ca arma chimica si arma biologica sunt arme de distrugere in masa. Acum scoateti ciunga din gura si silabisiti in timpul lecturii, ajuta la memorizare:

      1986. Iraq begins producing Sarin nerve agent.

      1986. Baghdad University purchased an assortment of germs from the American Type Culture Collection, for “medical” research.
      The collection serves as a global lending library for scientists doing research to combat infectious diseases to improve global health. Overseas customers were required to obtain a Commerce Department export license for the most virulent strains. These licenses had always been a formality since these germs were intended for peaceful research only, and the courtesy was extended to all who asked for legitimate reasons. Moscow, too has a vast collection of infectious diseases.

      1988. Al-Hakam, a large biological agent production facility, goes into operation in Iraq. Botulinin toxin and Anthrax are its main are its main production. By 1991 the plant produces about 125,000 gallons of agents. After stating for years that the plant was used to produce animal feed, the Iraqis admitted in 1995 that the plant was a biological warfare production facility. The admission come only as a result of a high-level defection. The site is supervised by Dr. Taha’s staff at Muthanna State Establishment.
      In addition to producing biological warfare agents, they also conducted live-agent tests on animals. The Iraqis also later admitted they had prepared about 200 biological missiles and bombs. Still unaccounted for.
      Hans Branscheidt a chemical expert says (in 2003), that Iraq purchased eight mobile chemical laboratories from the Federal Republic of Germany. He says that the construction of an Iraqi research center for missile technology “became almost exclusively the work of German companies.” This report is confirmed by the head of Germany’s intelligence service, August Hanning.

      1988, March 17. The village of Halabja was bombarded by Iraqi warplanes. The raid was over in minutes. A Kurd described the effects of a chemical attack on another village: “My brothers and my wife had blood and vomit running from their noses and their mouths. Their heads were tilted to one side. They were groaning. I couldn’t do much, just clean up the blood and vomit from their mouths and try in every way to make them breathe again. I did artificial respiration on them and then I gave them two injections each. I also rubbed creams on my wife and two brothers.” (From “Crimes Against Humanity” Iraqi National Congress.)

      1988, June. The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center at Ft. Detrick produces a classified study stating that Iraq is building a “bacteriological arsenal”. Among the agents identified are Anthrax and Botulinin toxin. The report states that they are also producing germs for assassinations and that Hussein Kamal, Saddam’s son-in-law and head of Iraq’s Intelligence Agency was personally supervising the program.
      The report stated that the Iraqis had purchased many of their starter germs from the American Type Culture Collection. The scientific supply company that maintains the collection, the largest collection of germ strains in the world, is located in Maryland and is the same place the Rajneeshee Cult purchased the germs for their “pharmacy”, which they used in their Bio-attack in Oregon.
      The intelligence report goes to the State Department, CIA, and various departments of the military. However, no one thinks to tell the Commerce Department or the American Type Culture not to allow any more purchases by Iraq.

      1988, July. Iraq tests new helicopters fitted with aerosol generators for dispersing Anthrax.

      1988, September. Human Rights Watch reports on Saddam’s attacks on the Kurds. Estimates vary, but according to Human Rights Watch up to 5,000 people were killed in the areas they are able to visit.
      Shortly before, there were rumors that Libya had used chemical weapons obtained from Iran during an invasion of Chad. The United States rushed 2,000 gas masks to Chad in response. There were also reports of the Cuban-backed government of Angola using nerve agents against rebel forces.

      1988, September 29. Iraq’s Ministry of Trade’s Technical and Scientific Materials Import Division (TSMID), which American intelligence had recently identified as the front for Iraq’s germ warfare program, orders additional germ cultures, one of which was Anthrax strain 11966. In February 1989, further sales to Iraq were banned. The Commerce Department also slammed the door shut on Iran, Libya, and Syria, who were also suspected of trying to develop germ weapons.

      1990, Spring. Iraq purchases 40 top-of-the-line aerosol generators capable, of disseminating 800 gallons of liquid an hour, from Italy. They are compact enough to fit in the back of a pickup truck, small boat, or single-engined aircraft.

      1990, June. American intelligence officials identify Iraq’s research center at Al Tuwaitha, near baghdad as a place suspected of engaging in the genetic engineering of bio-weapons. The assessment is made based on the “buying patterns” of the facility and the fact that Iraq’s top military scientists are working there.
      Al-Hakam begins producing Anthrax and by December turns out 2,200 gallons.

      1990, August. Iraq starts a crash program to develop a single nuclear weapon within a year. The goal is the rapid development of a small 50 machine gas centrifuge cascade to produce weapons-grade HEU using fuel from the Soviet research reactor, which was already substantially enriched, and unused fuel from the reactor bombed by the Israelis. By the time of the Gulf War, the crash program had made little progress. Iraq’s declared aim is to produce a missile warhead with a 20-kiloton yield.

      1990, August 2. Iraq invades Kuwait. At this time, Iraq’s bio weapon’s arsenal contains some 8500 liters of Anthrax spores, 19000 liters of Botulinum, 4000 liters of Aphlatoxin, and a quantity of Typhoid. They also possess up to 25 Scud warheads and 160 bombs equipped for BW.

      1990, August 6. The Navy sends it’s commanders an intelligence assessment on Iraq’s bio-weapons capability warning that Iraq’s germ weapons may be effective against ships at distances of up to 25 miles. It also stated that Iraq has substantial amounts of Botulinin toxin, Anthrax, Cholera, and Staphylococcus–among other agents. The CIA warns that Saddam has a significant number of artillery shells, missiles, bombs, rockets and high-performance aircraft equipped with sprayers for dispensing these agents. All modified Soviet equipment.
      War planners worry about how to deal with these weapons.

      1991, January 21. Coalition bombers strike what Iraq claims is a baby milk factory in
      Baghdad. The United States insists that Iraq is using it as a biological weapons development
      site. It appears the facility had briefly functioned as a “baby milk” factory in 1979 and 1980, and then again in the spring and summer of 1990, before the Iraqi regime began to use it as a biological weapons site. The site was defended as a military site at the time of the attack. It is prime example of a dual use facility.

      1991, March 4. At the Kamisiyah arsenal, northwest of Basra, the U.S. Army 37th Engineer Battalion blew up the Iraqi munitions storage bunkers. According to newspaper accounts, the engineers claimed that their chemical agent detectors went off during the explosions. Later the same year, a United Nations inspection team reportedly found the remains of chemical rockets and shells in one of the bunkers and found traces of sarin and mustard agent. In 1996, the department of defense acknowledged that one of the bunkers probably contained sarin- and mustard agent–filled munitions, and that as many as 20,000 U.S. soldiers may have been exposed to chemical agents as a result.

      1991, April. UNSCR 687, creates the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and requires Iraq to accept, unconditionally, “the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision” of its chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km, and their associated programs, stocks, components, research and facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is charged with destruction of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. UNSCOM and the IAEA must report that their mission has been achieved before the Security Council can end sanctions. They have not yet done so.

      1991, April 18. Iraq delivers its first official report to the U.N. on its unconventional weapons. They acknowledge limited production of chemical weapons but do not mention nuclear or biological weapons. It is later learned the top Iraqi official have been ordered by Tariq Aziz to hide all evidence of these weapons, as well their stocks of VX (an advanced nerve agent), from inspectors.

      1991, August 2. UNSCOM’s first biological inspections team arrives in Iraq. They are given a one-page statement that acknowledges that they performed biological research for defensive military purposes.
      Between 1991 and 1998 UNSCOM succeeded in identifying and destroying very large quantities of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles as well as associated production facilities. The IAEA also destroyed the infrastructure for Iraq’s nuclear weapons program and removed key nuclear materials. This was achieved despite a continuous and sophisticated program of harassment, obstruction, deception and denial. Because of this UNSCOM concluded by 1998 that it was unable to fulfill its mandate. The inspectors were withdrawn in December 1998.
      From Iraqi declarations to the UN after the Gulf War we know that by 1991 Iraq had produced a variety of delivery means for chemical and biological agents including over 16,000 free-fall bombs and over 110,000 artillery rockets and shells. Iraq also admitted to the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) that it had 50 chemical and 25 biological warheads available for its ballistic missiles.
      UNSCOM discovers samples of indigenously-produced highly enriched uranium, forcing Iraq’s acknowledgment of uranium enrichment programs and attempts to preserve key components of its prohibited nuclear weapons program.

      1991, September. CIA identifies 8 sites suspected of germ production. On the list is Al Hakem which the Iraqis claim is just a warehouse, but is surrounded by security fences spaced 2 miles apart. When inspectors arrive the Iraqis change their story and say that it is a factory for making animal feed. At the time of their visit it is in fact making animal feed, but suspicions are aroused because of medical quality of the equipment and the fact that the plant is staffed by highly trained micro-biologists. It would later be proved that this facility had been one of Iraq’s primary bio-weapons production lines, making tons of Botulinin and Anthrax. It is a perfect example of a “dual-use” facility.

      1995. After four years of deception, Iraq finally admits it had a crash nuclear weapons program prior to the Gulf War. Were it not for that war, the regime in Iraq would likely have possessed a nuclear weapon no later than 1993. Iraq still employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians and retains physical infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.
      In July, after being presented with proof that they have been lying, Iraq admits that Al-Hakam is, in fact, a bio-weapons facility that had been used to produce Botulinum and Anthrax. They present what they claim is a complete disclosure of their program. In it they claim all stockpiles were destroyed after the war with Iran.
      A month later, Lieutenant General Hussein Kamael, a son-in-law of Saddam, and the man who had run Iraq’s bio-weapons program defects to Jordan. Assuming he is about to spill his guts to the U.N. (incorrectly it turns out), Iraqi officials claim they have “discovered” a new cache of documents on a chicken-farm owned by Kamel. It detailed the weaponization of thousands of liters of Anthrax, Botulinum toxin, and Aflatoxin for use with Scud warheads, aerial bombs and aircraft.
      Iraq also admits in that a MIG-21 remote-piloted vehicle tested in 1991 was intended to carry a biological weapon spray system. Iraq perviously denied any connection between UAV programs and chemical or biological agent dispersal.

      “We know they [the inspectors] are playing an intelligence role. The way they are conducting their inspections and the sites they are visiting have nothing to do with weapons of mass destruction. But we are cooperating with inspection teams in a positive way in order to expose the lies of those who have bad intentions.” – Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan.

      1995, April. UNSCOM reports to the UN Security Council that Iraq had concealed its biological weapons program and had failed to account for 3 tons of growth material for biological agents.

      1997, October. A protracted confrontation with Saddam Hussein begins after Iraq accuses U.S. members of the U.N. inspection teams of being spies and expels the majority of U.S. participants. The U.N. Security Council threatens renewed economic sanctions. The confrontation continues into November as Iraq expels the remaining six U.S. inspectors and the United Nations withdraws other inspectors in protest. Inspectors are readmitted after the United States and Great Britain again begin a military build-up in the Gulf. However, in November, Iraq announces it will not allow inspectors access to sites designated as “palaces and official residences.” U.N. officials protest, having long suspected that such sites were being used to conceal possible weapons of mass destruction.

      1998, November 11. U.N. weapons inspectors are kicked out of Iraq by Saddam. Based on the UNSCOM report to the UN Security Council in January 1999 and earlier UNSCOM reports, when the UN inspectors left Iraq they were unable to account for: up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tons of VX nerve agent; up to 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals, including approximately 300 tons of which, in the Iraqi chemical warfare program, were unique to the production of VX; growth media procured for biological agent production (enough to produce over three times the 8,500 liters of anthrax spores Iraq admits to having manufactured); over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents.
      During their tenure, UNSCOM turns up several “cookbooks” for chemical and biological weapons.

      1999, January. The UN Special Commission reports that Iraq failed to provide credible evidence that 550 mustard gas-filled artillery shells and 400 biological weapons-capable aerial bombs had been lost or destroyed.
      UNSCOM concludes that Iraq has not accounted for 1.5 tons of VX, a powerful nerve agent. Former UNSCOM head Richard Butler wrote that “a missile warhead of the type Iraq has made and used can hold some 140 liters of VX… A single such warhead would contain enough of the chemical to kill up to 1 million people.”

      2001. An Iraqi defector, Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, says he has visited twenty secret facilities for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Mr. Saeed, a civil engineer, supports his claims with stacks of Iraqi government contracts, complete with technical specifications. Mr. Saeed said Iraq uses front companies to purchase dual-use equipment with the blessing of the United Nations – and then secretly used the equipment for their weapons programs.

      2001. Iraq announces that it will begin renovating the al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility, one of two known bio-containment, level-three, facilities in Iraq that have an extensive air handling and filtering system. Iraq has admitted that this was a biological weapons facility. Iraq starts the plant without UN approval, ostensibly to produce vaccines that it could more easily and more quickly import through the UN.

      2001, January. The Department of Defense reports that Iraq has continued to work on its weapons programs, including converting L-29 jet trainer aircraft for the delivery of chemical or biological weapons.


      Germs, by Judith Miller, 2001.
      Breaking With Moscow, Arkady Schevchenko, 1985.
      The Collapse of Communism, ed.by Bernard Gwerlzman & Michael T. Kaufman, 1990.
      Counter-Terrorist, Sam Hall, 1987.
      Inside Spetznaz: Soviet Special Operations, Maj. William H. Burgess III, 1990.
      KGB: The Inside Story Of Its Foreign Operations From Lenin To Gorbachev, Christopher Andrew & Oleg Gordievsky, 1990.
      The Middle East Conflicts: From 1945 to the Present, John Pimlott, 1983.
      The Rape of Kuwait, Jean P. Sassan, 1991.
      Saddam Hussein and The Crisis In The Gulf, Judith Miller & Laurie Myloroie, 1990.
      Saddam’s Bomb Maker, Dr. Khidhir Hamza, 2002.
      Soviet Strategic Deception, Brian D. Daily & Patrick J. Parker, 1987.
      Target America, by Yoseff Bodansky, 1993.


    9. Doamna sau domnul Madgearu sau Osman ( va spun asa pentru ca am avut o surpriza de curand , cand domnul X era doamna Z , sau doamna Z era .. insfarsit , incurcatura mare , asa ca incerc sa ” acopar ” toate posibilitatile si sa nu uit , v-am zis Osman , pentru ca dupa cum ganditi nu sunteti cu siguranta Madgearu ) , mi-as dori sa va vad la Teheran in postura doamnei Madgearu nu a d-nei Osman ( o sa intelegeti de ce ) . Stati in interiorul unei cafenele , va beti cafeaua sau ceaiul linistita si admirati prin vitrina larga , teatrul anonimatului uman , adica strada ( chestia asta nu-i de la mine ) . Comentati ceea ce vedeti cu sotul . Deodata va vedeti copilul ( 5 ani ) care cu o clipa inainte se juca la piciorele mesei , cum se pierde printre trecatorii grabiti . Va repeziti , nebuna ( imi cer scuze ) de spaima , pe usa cafenelei si alergati sa va prindeti copilul care tocmai se pregateste sa treaca strada . Deodata , ca din senin asupra dvs. incepe sa ploua …..cu lovituri …. de baston sau bastoane , pentru ca inainte de a va prabusi la pamant , apucati sa vedeti cum trei barbosi va trag de zor bastoane pe spinare , peste picioare , pe unde apuca . Nu , sa stiti ca nu sunt republicanii americani , cum poate va inchipuiti , asa echilibrata si obiectiva cum sunteti . Sunt militienii Basij care va atentioneaza , conform legilor iraniene , ca ati iesit pe strada cu capul gol ( imi cer din nou scuze ) , cu capul descoperit . Nu v-am spus o poveste , intamplarea asta prin care nu mi-as dori sa treceti , chiar s-a intamplat 🙂 unei romance ( turista ) care intamplator gandea ca dvs. Acuma , dupa experienta asta , a inceput sa Gandeasca ( cu adevarat ) . Oricum , la cat de simpatica sunteti , nu va recomand New York-ul . Vizitati Teheranul 🙂

    10. ….Carmen, si daca scapati din Teheran mergeti la Kabul si apoi la Islamabad. Experimentati echilibrul si obiectivitatea la ele acasa!
      As fi putut sa zic si Cairo, dar dupa cm decurg lucrurile se pare ca Mubarack nu pleaca . Diplomatii lui Barack O. schimba tonul, acum spun ca ei nu au vrut niciodata plecarea “ultimului faraon”. Cu alte cuvinte, Fratia Musulmana mai sta o tura!

      In’shallah my sis!

    11. Bugsy, eu astept raspuns la “MOARTE LUI CARMEN MADGEARU!”. 😀 Pe astia asa trebuie sa-i iei, cu lucruri concrete, altfel nu pricep.

    12. @13, Vlad M: Ptr entitati (nu le pot numi persoane, as jigni regnul uman) gen Madgearu (si altele ca ele, Neema, for instance) a spune “Moarte Americii!” sau “Moarte Israelului!” e un lucru firesc, normal, o “pozitie echilibrata”. La intrebarea ta nu vei obtine nici un raspuns, poate doar acuzatii de instigare, bla, bla, . Cred ca nici lucrurile concrete nu le pricep. Pur si simplu, ei/ele NU PRICEP!

    13. bugsy @ 15 . Entitati , imi place mult , pentru valoarea simbolica si sonoritatea strivitoare . Eu le spuneam ” vietuitoare ” dar m-ai convins , voi folosi de acum inainte , ” entitati ” . Entitatile nu pricepe 🙂

    14. Ca sa vorbesti cu socialistii trebuie sa te sui pe un tanc. Altfel vorbele sunt goale.

      Nu ati remarcat cat de des folosesc acestia cuvantul “concret“? Ei bine, exact asta e cauza..


    15. filmul poate parea o instigare la razboi impotriva Iranului

      Saddam facea pe victima, Ahmadinejad se lauda ca detine nucleara. Daca in primul caz ati pus botul (ca sa vorbesc pe intelesul arogantei voastre), in al doilea nu mai aveti nicio scuza: omul va spune cu gura lui ca lucreaza la nucleara si ca va sterge Israelul de pe harta. Intelegerea voastra e bine ferecata. Pe vecie?


    16. Costin: Funny this movie was released in the midst of Egyptian protest. I am not at all familiar with Iranian history, or Middle Eastern politics for that matter, but wow, does it seem awfully familiar.

    17. Pe de-o parte Sadam se dadea victima, pe de alta, ameninta Israelul. nu mai tin minte daca simultan, sau in perioade oarecum diferite, cert este ca ameninta ca trimite “cadouri de toata frumusetea” in israel. Eu zic ca daca o tara ameninta alta tara, cu asta lezindu-i bunastarea si calitatea de viata, ingrijorind si panicind populatia, acea tara agresiva trebuie sa isi asume responsibilitate la ce declara. Sa nu se mire de consecinte. Daca n-are cu ce, sa nu dezechilibreze linistea pamintului.

      In alta ordine de idei, ce avea Sadam Husein cu Israelul? Strict vorbind, era un conflict dintre Irac si Ameicani plus alte tari aliate, pe motivul ca Sadam invadase Kuweitul. Ei, dar nu tocmai asa, stingistii Israelieni au sarit sa dea vina pe Israel ca o meritam, deoarece noi mai demult ne-am bagat nasul si le-am distrus acestora curul atomic (scuzati expresia dar chiar asa ii zice pe ivrit – cur atomic = reactor nuclear). O lume intreaga ne-a acuzat in anii ’80, in loc sa se bucure. Altfel, Sadam ar fi fost echipat si periculos ca Ahmedinidgad acum, iar razboiul cu Iracul ar fi fost cu totul altceva.

    18. Oh, and by the way, as I was discussing with Costin earlier, I did not put two and two together when trying to understand why in the world Orascom would invest in North Korea. For a couple of years, I was wrecking my brain wondering why anybody with two active brain cells would invest in a place that is known to shaft investors. North Korea has still not paid back debt, and is traded in the exotic bond market. Then I started talking with Costin, then it hit like a ton of bricks; Orascom is in Egypt. Egypt has been in bed with the North Koreans for decades. It is the famous, the enemy of my enemy is my friend kind of thing. Now if the Muslim Brotherhood were to take over, they have a very good friend indeed.

    19. Merci Pataphyl (Andrei R.)

      Dintr-un alt articol:

      “Saddam Hussein, in the 1990s, felt no constraint in both threatening Israel with chemical weapons and launching Scud missiles against it … “


    Please enter your comment!
    Please enter your name here