Gazprom, noul proprietar al celei mai mari stații subterane de stocare de gaz natural din Europa

conducta urengoi-ucraina-ue (aia care se inchide acum, o data la citiva ani) s-a construit in anii 80 cu sprijinul frantei, germaniei, italiei; reagan si thatcher s-au opus, au stabilit sanctiuni economice (impotriva urss dar si a firmelor occidentale care au continuat sa lucreze cu rusii), etc; mai ales in urma impunerii legii martiale in polonia (de catre moscova, desigur); reagan a avertizat occidentul in privinta riscurilor dependentei de gazul rusesc; nu au ascultat atunci, de ce ar face altfel acum? tranzactia asta pare o continuare fireasca in politica europeana; sau, cum ar spune marii actori romani, “un arc peste timp”

25.02.1982 – SOVIET GAS PIPELINE: U.S. OPTIONS

The construction of a 3,000 mile-long pipeline to bring natural gas from the Urengoi field in Siberia to the West European natural gas network is a critical element of Soviet energy plans for the 1980s. Through the pipeline, which is planned to be operational by 1984, the Soviets plan to export an additional 40 billion cubic meters (BCK) of natural gas annually to Western Europe, tripling the current export level. Pipe and equipment from West Europe and Japan, and credit from Western banks are essential if the pipeline is to be completed on time. The Reagan Administration and the West European governments are sharply divided on the desirability of the pipeline. The Administration and some Members of Congress argue that the pipeline would make West European participants overly dependent on Soviet natural gas and equipment orders and, thus, vulnerable to Soviet threats to cut off the gas in a political crisis. They also argue that the USSR would obtain much needed convertible currency from the gas sales. The West Europeans respond that vulnerability to the Soviet “gas leverpp can be avoided by the creation of a “safety net” of alternative supplies of non-Soviet gas and other fuels.

Although some West European political parties are hesitant, most Europeans believe that participation is essential to their plans for reducing their dependence on OPEC oil and for diversifying supplies of natural gas. In addition, they note that equipment orders for the export pipeline and the other pipelines that the Soviets plan to bring gas to the central regions of the Soviet Union, which may total $10 – 15 billion in the first half of. the decade, could spell the difference between prosperity and recession for key industrial sectors.

In the U.S. policy debate two schools have emerged. One would make every effort to halt or delay the pipeline by direct or indirect methods, while the other would treat the pipeline as a fait accompli and focus on measures to reduce West European vulnerability to the “gas lever.” The differences between the schools of thought were heightened first in December 1982 wehn President Reagan banned U.S. sales of energy related equipment and technology to the U.S.S.R. and then in June 1982 when these sanctions were expanded to include U.S. affiliates and foreign companies with U.S. contractual relations. This broadened coverage has added the issues of retroactivity, extraterritoriality, and contract sanctity to the portfolio of the fait accompli school. Congressional action was unsuccessful in overturning the Administration’s action (th Findley-Bonkers – H.R. 6838) in September. The Broomfield amendment tied the removal of the sanctions to Administration assurance that “forced laborw is not being or would not be used in the construction of the export pipeline.

http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs8790/m1/1/high_res_d/IB82020_1982Oct08.pdf

Au obtinut controlul si a celei din Ungaria, de acum incolo o sa poata puna presiune pe Ucraina fara sa afecteze exportul catre EU.

http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2014/10/16/gazprom-stores-some-of-its-natural-gas-in-hungarian-facilities/